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In 1926 John Maurice Clark published a seminal text in institutional-
ist economics, Social Control of Business, surveying the ways in which 
business was subject to control by a variety of formal and informal 
 constraints.1 The text rejected mainstream ideas in neoclassical politi-
cal economy by explaining how individual self-interest and competition 
could be manipulated not only through legal rules but also by custom, 
habit, codes of ethics, and morals. Representative of the institutionalist 
movement, Clark discarded presumptions of an individualistic economy 
based on market competition. Instead, he posited that long-term public 
goals of prosperity and equity could be achieved through the public and 
private study of “industry itself,” which existed “on the frontier where 
new policies are being worked out.”2 The book fused the development 
of the regulatory state, giving particular attention to administrative law, 
with self-regulation by businesses and trade associations. Both public 
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and private regulations, he argued, advanced codes of conduct to stand-
ardize business activities and control competitive practices. Building on 
the work of Richard Ely, John Commons, and Dean Roscoe Pound, 
Clark’s Social Control of Business extended progressive liberals’ initiatives 
for regulatory state expansion through administrative agencies and it 
advanced private rulemaking by trade associations as a complement to 
the development of mandatory public regulation.
Social Control of Business epitomized the first great law and economics 
movement’s challenge to the neoclassical paradigm of academic research 
and public policy.3 Rather than pursuing a policy agenda based on a 
singular model of human behavior or industrial order, the institutional-
ists believed that social science research should guide policy makers in 
shaping rules and regulations according to the particular structure of a 
given industry. The purpose of industry-specific studies was twofold: to 
understand the economic dynamics of an industry, giving especial atten-
tion to social costs or negative externalities, and to construct a detailed 
account of the macroeconomy as a whole. That approach resulted in a 
slew of studies and policies that many critics have said amounted to lit-
tle more than questioning of orthodox economics, rather than a coher-
ent research agenda. Institutional economics, in turn, has been largely 
dismissed and overlooked by mainstream economic and policy history 
because of its limited duration in the academy and its very diverse pol-
icy prescriptions.4 Dismissing the influence of institutionalism obscures 
the intellectual origins and social purposes of the 1920s “new econom-
ics” in academic research, regulatory policy, and private self-regulation.
This essay argues that one of the central tenets of institutionalist law 
and economics—the social control of business—helped structure the 
research and planning agendas of administrative agencies, such as the 
Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
as well as private research organizations, including Harvard Business 
School (HBS), the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC).5 The motivation 
toward social control united progressive liberal economists who sought 
to reform not only academic research methods but also policy-making 
outcomes. Their experiences during WWI with domestic economic 
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planning motivated the institutionalists toward postwar collaboration 
with government officials, regulators, and private research institutes. 
By the mid-1920s, the first great law and economics movement had 
embedded a long-term research agenda within both public adminis-
trative agencies and private research institutes, both of which pursued 
social science research in economic planning.
***
Interwar Institutional Economics
At the close of the First World War, the American Economic 
Association (AEA) convened a small, one-day conference to discuss 
various aspects of postwar recovery. Sessions covered monetary stabil-
ity, maintenance of international peace, price fixing during peacetime, 
and the future of agricultural policies.6 At that conference, Walton 
Hamilton coined the term “institutionalist economics” to signal a break 
with existing US economic thought and policy. In turn, Hamilton 
emerged as the initial spokesperson for a group of progressive liberal 
economists who believed neoclassical economics, theory, and regula-
tion could not address the new economic realities of the postwar world. 
Cosponsored by the American Sociological Society, his panel, entitled 
“Economic Theory,” stood apart from the rest. At that panel, Walton 
Hamilton laid out a new agenda not only for economic theory and 
research methods but also for economic regulation.7
Hamilton’s paper, which appeared in the following year’s American 
Economic Review, surveyed the state of the discipline and argued that 
neoclassical economics’ reliance on subjective value theory had led 
the discipline away from critical analysis and toward becoming noth-
ing more than status quo apologists.8 “Only in recent years has value 
theory escaped a formal association with laissez faire [but] now even 
its most positive statements bear in such terms as ‘utility’ and ‘produc-
tivity’ and in the wording of principles [belie] implications about the 
worthwhileness of prevailing arrangements.”9 Neoclassical economics 
was not wholly laissez faire, Hamilton conceded; however, the subjective 
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theory of value relied upon the premise of free competition and indi-
vidual choice that Hamilton questioned. The world had changed with 
industrialization and world war, Hamilton and many other progressive 
economists argued, bringing new social problems and greater demand 
for control of powerful economic interests. Institutional economics, he 
offered as an alternative, was “concerned with industry in relation to 
human well-being.”10
Economics had taken for granted the institutions—derived from 
custom, habit, and formal legal structures—that ordered economic 
relationships. Hamilton argued that because “institutions are social 
arrangements capable of change rather than obstinate natural phenom-
ena,” economics “should be relevant to the modern problem of con-
trol.”11 Whereas neoclassical economists’ focus on value theory had 
been “derived from the classical doctrine of organization of industry 
[based] upon the principles of free competition,” the institutionalist 
research agenda began not with the presumption of perfect competition 
but rather focused on the inherent malleability of economic relation-
ships.12 Rather than seeking out “economics statics” and equilibria to 
explain the “immutable” laws of industrial economies, Hamilton envi-
sioned administrative agencies and private initiatives capable of iden-
tifying the “economic dynamics” that created and distributed value. 
Partnership between business, government, and the social sciences could 
temper competition and improve the distribution of wealth. Those 
new administrative bodies could collaborate with firms and trade asso-
ciations so as to gather information and help shape business interac-
tions through “conscious control.” The purpose of the “social control” 
of business would be to improve not only efficiencies but also, perhaps 
more importantly, the distribution of wealth and resources.
For Hamilton, as with the institutionalist movement more  generally, 
not all market competition improved social welfare or maximized effi-
ciencies. In response, his life’s work was dedicated to the pursuit of 
economic models and legal reforms that employed new management 
techniques for a public purpose. Others in this movement— including 
Wesley Claire Mitchell, Sumner Slichter, Leo Wiloman, Dexter Keezer, 
Stacy May, and Morris Copeland—were also concerned with the 
responsibilities of business to society.13 Their great insight was that 
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neoclassical economics had failed to incorporate ethical or societal con-
siderations into its economic models, instead presuming that free com-
petition necessarily maximized aggregate welfare.
Several leading institutional economists pioneered studies in business 
cycles, investigating the causes of economic booms and busts as well as 
the social costs of economic adjustments. Wesley Mitchell, who devel-
oped the most influential theory of business cycles in 1913, provided 
a trenchant critique of neoclassical value theory and its presumption of 
rational decision making.14 Borrowing from Thorstein Veblen’s criticism 
of mainstream economics’ portrayal of man as a “lightning calculator of 
pleasure and pain,” Mitchell argued that such a hedonistic conception 
of man failed to consider the psychological or evolutionary influences 
on decision making.15 Rather than fixing prices according to market 
supply and demand, for example, businesspeople could be driven to 
“ruinous competition,” wherein prices fall below costs, by their desire 
to destroy rivals. Not only could such behavior reduce competition and 
facilitate market consolidation, it also increased unemployment, drove 
down wages, and facilitated underconsumption.16 Mitchell also exam-
ined banks’ pro-cyclical lending, businesses’ over-leveraging during a 
boom, and the concomitant bankruptcies characteristic of an economic 
bust or recession. Mitchell’s work on business cycles and prescriptions 
for macroeconomic “social experiments” to mitigate downturns proved 
influential during the brief but sharp postwar recession.
Clark’s Social Control of Business built upon Mitchell’s study of busi-
ness cycles by emphasizing that private rights alone could not satisfy the 
needs of a complex industrial society. Rather than individuals guiding 
business decisions, Clark presented six case studies that examined for-
mal industrial regulations, extralegal codes of ethics used by business 
and professional associations, and informal union rules. In his final 
chapter, “If I were Dictator,” he reflected on how those overlapping 
rules and mechanisms might be employed to negate the negative exter-
nalities of industrial production, including waste of natural resources, 
unemployment, and underconsumption. Critically, however, Clark 
believed that the administrative state must partner with business, pro-
fessional, and labor organizations rather than dictate state-led or top-
down regulations. He intended that partnership to preserve the positive 
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benefits of the price mechanism, while also guiding closer coordination 
between business and government.17
The institutionalists appealed to the wider world of progressive 
reform and political discourse. Despite their critics, they developed sev-
eral programs for the collection, tabulation, and dissemination of busi-
ness statistics by appealing to reformers, business groups, and regulators. 
First, they built on the progressive liberal tradition emerging at the turn 
of the century that emphasized the interdependencies created by mod-
ern industrialization and urbanization. The institutionalists came from 
a cohort of pragmatic social reformers, such as John Dewey, Herbert 
Croly, and Walter Lippmann, who supported the expansion of state 
power to better citizens’ lives. Institutionalists built on those impulses 
and contributed a technocratic vision of expert-led governance through 
administrative state agencies and trade associations. Secondly, the insti-
tutionalists also appealed to a diverse set of businesspeople seeking to 
rationalize business management practices—sometimes through top-
down regulation but more often through deliberative organizations 
outside of government. Finally, their empirical approach attracted the 
attention of both business associations and state agencies, creating new 
collaborations between academic economists, private commercial asso-
ciations, and government regulators.18
In their rejection of universal principles and generalizable economic 
rules, the institutionalists preferred deductive logic, which required 
industry-specific studies to evaluate the changing processes of price and 
wage setting, patterns of employment, and procedures to manage com-
petitive markets. In order to paint “a picture of the pragmatic reality 
called industry,” they pursued present business statistics as well as his-
torical data in search of social and economic trends.19 Then as now, the 
great strength and purpose of the institutionalists’ research agenda also 
became its Achilles’ heel. The main critique against the institutional-
ists was their lack of a coherent research method or any generalizable 
theory of value or competition.20 But, of course, this was precisely their 
point—neither economic conditions nor their governing institutions 
remained static, and the purpose of the social sciences should be to 
understand how those institutional constraints could be used to govern 
dynamic economies.
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Social Control and the Administrative State
The institutionalists’ critique of neoclassical economics and law reflected 
a pervasive reconsideration of market competition that had resulted 
from the economic realities of a changing industrial order. Prior to 
the wartime experience of a coordinated market economy, formal legal 
rules and administrative agencies had been created to manage a rapidly 
changing economy. Corporate consolidations around the turn of the 
century had been met with the consternation of farmers, small propri-
etors, and laborers who felt disenfranchised from the economic gains 
made by corporate capitalists. Those social dislocations that accompa-
nied industrialization and urbanization informed the regulatory politics 
of the anti-monopoly movement, which feared not only the consolida-
tion of market power suppressing competitive markets but also the cor-
responding malady of undue political influence corrupting democratic 
political processes. In turn, the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
of 1890 forbade restraints of trade and monopolization in interstate 
commerce. Yet, it failed to stem the growth of large-scale corpora-
tions or abuses of dominant firm position, such as predatory pricing. 
Additionally, the US Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of the law 
occluded any associational activities that could be construed as collu-
sive and, thereby, the Court further incentivized vertical consolidation. 
The institutionalists provided economic reasoning for a political and 
regulatory movement to further revise the rules of competition through 
administrative experts, rather than legislative processes. They endorsed 
new administrative controls intended to manage competitive processes 
so as to reduce social costs and market externalities associated with these 
corporate consolidations and market fluctuations.
Although the passage of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and 
Clayton Acts of 1914 failed to settle the uncertainty of competition 
policy, these did empower an administrative agency to review and pros-
ecute anticompetitive business activities. That legislation created the 
FTC, which prohibited price discrimination, tying contracts, interlock-
ing directorates, and unfair methods of competition, and also exempted 
labor unions from antitrust prosecution. President Wilson, who signed 
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the act, asked the US Chamber of Commerce (USCC) to participate in 
an experiment with the FTC to “match all the facts of business through-
out the country and to see the vast and consistent pattern of it,” just 
as the Department of Agriculture did for farmers.21 Joseph Davies, 
Commissioner of Corporations at the Department of Commerce, 
explained that the purpose of the FTC was “to convert the anarchy of 
unlicensed competition into a condition under law of competitive lib-
erty, which will preserve those seeds of individual initiative and enter-
prise.”22 The liberal democratic goals espoused by the FTC mirrored the 
nascent formation of institutionalist research and policy agendas.
During its first years, FTC commissioners promoted uniform cost 
accounting and information sharing on industrial trade statistics in 
efforts to promote standardized business practices largely through trade 
associations and minimal public oversight. FTC Commissioner Edward 
Hurley, former president of the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association, 
explained that reliable cost information must be the first step in ration-
alizing intra- and inter-business practices.23 In an FTC pamphlet circu-
lated to 230,000 businesses and commercial associations, for example, 
Hurley explained that rather than focusing only on sales volume, man-
agers should determine the costs and revenues of each specific prod-
uct line and distribute the overhead expenses accordingly. The manual 
demonstrated bookkeeping methods to actuate product line expense 
reports.24
Uniform cost accounting standardized methods to calculate prices 
and, thereby, influenced what constituted a fair price according to both 
the informal rules promulgated by trade associations and the stand-
ards enforced through FTC prosecutions. The notion of an enforce-
able standard of fair competition required basic bookkeeping before 
the FTC could sufficiently regulate trade practices or act as a clearing-
house for industry information. Training “industrial secretaries” became 
a focal point of USCC meetings. Paul Cherington, an economist 
and marketing professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Business 
Administration, as it was then known, led a special committee on retail 
prices and cost accounting for the Chamber. For Cherington and other 
progressive economists and businesspeople, unfair competition carried a 
destructive edge that cut against independent proprietors. “Destructive” 
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or “cutthroat” practices included secret rebates given to large-scale retail-
ers, sales below cost, and loss leader advertising. These activities, they 
argued, threatened the long-term viability of competitive markets for 
quality consumer durables by reducing the number of competitors.25 
Cherington, along with Paul Nystrom (a Wisconsin-educated economist), 
embraced Brandeisian logic that valued a decentralized economic order 
and endorsed antitrust exemptions for associations of small proprietors.
Although the institutionalists did not promote restrictions on firm 
size or scope, they shared progressive liberals’ fears that concentrated 
economic power might lead to predatory practices and monopoly. 
Searching for a middle ground between conceding to oligopolies of 
large firms and preserving inefficient firms, the institutionalists’ public-
private regulatory approach to protecting competitive markets reflected 
the policy preferences of Louis Brandeis, an architect of the FTC. 
Those efforts to manage market competition through trade association 
rulemaking that often bordered on collusive behavior also provoked the 
ire of some dominant firms. For example, Percy Straus of Macy’s, a chain 
department store based in New York, led efforts against Resale Price 
Maintenance, a coordinating device used by small and independent pro-
prietors to standardize brand name prices across all retail outlets.26
The administrative reordering of public and private interests 
informed not only President Wilson’s stance on domestic competition 
policy but also mobilization efforts during the First World War. Both 
progressive economists and leading businesspeople participated in war-
time planning efforts, many of whom became advocates for codes of fair 
competition and greater collaboration between government and busi-
ness to rationalize markets through standardized business practices and 
information sharing. Yet, the wartime experience did not create a fully 
institutionalized order. Initially, smaller businesses had begun efforts at 
voluntary war preparedness, and later, Bernard Baruch, chairman of the 
War Industries Board (WIB), led efforts for “cooperative committees of 
industry.”27 The WIB did not authorize outright price fixing, although 
military purchasing bureaus enforced price restrictions. It left an ambig-
uous legacy—it relied on the voluntary collaboration of trade associa-
tions and government regulators, creating neither a fully coordinated 
nor a cartelized economy.
358     L. Phillips Sawyer
The war’s legacy strengthened the appeal of public-private manage-
ment of competitive industries as a viable model for American regu-
lation and antitrust reform, especially for small and medium-sized 
firms for whom corporate consolidations appeared most threatening. 
The war’s celebrated legacy of the social control of business galvanized 
both institutional economists and administrative regulators interested 
in rationalizing business interactions to institute social and economic 
reforms.28 But the FTC’s renewed attention to trade association activi-
ties and policing competitive business practices almost immediately 
provoked a jurisdictional dispute with the Court, regarding which 
branch of government could determine what constituted unfair trade 
practices.29 Despite the Court’s ruling that narrowed the FTC’s author-
ity, businesspeople within the USCC and regulators at the FTC and 
Department of Commerce continued to pursue rulemaking authority 
through administrative interventions.
The wartime experience strengthened the institutionalists’ research 
agenda and broadened the appeal of private businesses partnering with 
public administrative agencies as beneficial to both private  concerns 
and public interest. This confluence of factors helped to rework the 
conceptual category of market competition. By the 1920s, a  distinctly 
American view of “new economics” captured prominent economic 
departments, business schools, government bureaus, and USCC 
debates. Advocates envisioned a system of cooperative capitalism that 
managed production and consumption so as to maintain price stability, 
facilitate innovation, and ensure fair play among competitors.
Through the 1920s, this program for managing American com-
petition became part of the administrative role of the Department 
of Commerce and FTC. With Herbert Hoover at the helm of the 
Department of Commerce, he took over many of the standardization, 
conservation, and information-sharing efforts first initiated by the WIB 
and carried these into peacetime. In his role as US Food Administrator 
during the war, Hoover had led a team of businesspeople and economic 
experts to coordinate production and distribution of foodstuffs abroad. 
“Food will win the war,” he promised the USCC.30 Indeed the wide-
spread success of wartime industry coordination helped popularize 
the associational movement, not for price controls per se but certainly 
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for the continuation of information sharing and standardization pro-
grams. In July of 1921, the Commerce Department began publishing 
a monthly Survey of Current Business, a collection of industry statistics 
on bids, prices, quantities sold, and orders. The Survey lent authority to 
the “open price association” model, which had received support from 
Louis Brandeis and Arthur Jerome Eddy a decade earlier as a method 
by which trade associations might mitigate the so-called ruinous com-
petition through mandatory information sharing.31 Similarly, Hoover 
helped reform the Census Bureau to gather and disseminate eco-
nomic statistics for both private businesses and public regulators. The 
Government Printing Office published endless pamphlets and manuals 
on cost accounting, industry standards and statistics, and business cycle 
reports.32
Hoover’s influence reached beyond the Department of Commerce 
as well, extending to the FTC and Department of Justice by mid-dec-
ade. Under his leadership, a series of government-sponsored confer-
ences brought together businesspeople, public officials, and reformers 
to address a range of business problems, including overfishing Alaskan 
salmon, oil by-products in the Chesapeake Bay, and highway safety. By 
the mid-1920s, the FTC began hosting industry-wide trade practice 
conferences, building on the engineer’s conviction that standardized 
practices could eliminate waste in production methods and employ-
ment fluctuations. These conferences were intended to rationalize busi-
ness practices and set standards for what constituted fair competition.
Hoover’s close economic aide, Wesley Mitchell, urged the Commerce 
Secretary to consider how these social costs of doing business were 
transferred onto the public at large.33 Hoover’s interest in reduc-
ing waste and rationalizing industry coincided with Mitchell’s insti-
tutional agenda to reduce the costs of industry. Although Hoover did 
not endorse direct economic interventions in most cases, he expanded 
the federal government’s sphere of influence over business through 
data collection, tabulation, and distribution. Moreover, as chairman 
of President Harding’s Committee on Recent Economic Changes, he 
adopted Mitchell’s language of “social experimentation” to alleviate 
unemployment endemic to business cycle swings. Although Hoover 
agreed that capriciousness of the market led to labor unrest and 
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unemployment, transferring social costs from business to society, he 
was not prepared to accept institutionalists’ proposed labor legislation. 
Nevertheless, the fact-finding missions of the Committee on Recent 
Economic Changes as well as the capacity building of administrative 
agencies influenced the range of policy proposals available to President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s first administration.
Despite his initial efforts, Hoover could not stifle Department 
of Justice prosecutions of such loose combinations under Attorney 
General Harry Daugherty’s leadership; however, Hoover did outlast 
him. When Daugherty stepped down in April 1924, President Calvin 
Coolidge nominated Harlan Fiske Stone to replace him. A friend of 
Hoover and progressive economists alike, Stone, who would join the 
Supreme Court only a year later, initiated test cases against trade asso-
ciations in order to clarify what industry cooperation would pass con-
stitutional muster. For example‚ Stone brought an antitrust suit against 
the Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association for information shar-
ing on production  processes, bids, and output. Then, one year later, 
as a newly appointed Court Justice, he penned the Court’s opinion 
upholding the association agreements. The trade associations, according 
to Stone’s majority opinion, had collaborated to reduce waste and had 
also reduced prices, relative to nonmembers. Also, the Court held, the 
association’s collaboration with the Department of Commerce provided 
important  information to the Federal Reserve and other departments of 
 government.34 Although the institutionalists had not formalized a the-
ory of public-private management of competitive markets, a shift in the 
American  regulatory system had taken place by the mid-1920s.35
Academic Experts and Intermediary 
Organizations
The attention given to Hoover’s Department of Commerce obscures 
the role of a wide range of advocates in public service and private 
research institutes who also fostered a public-private system of managed 
competition.36 The popularity of institutionalist research methods and 
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goals to rationalize internal management and stabilize inter-firm com-
petition spread to leading research universities and institutes. Animated 
by a belief in the responsibility of business to society and the possibility 
for new forms of social control, a loosely coordinated movement arose 
across a variety of newly established research organizations, including 
Harvard Business School (HBS), the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). 
These private organizations pursued industry-specific studies to bet-
ter understand competitive practices and the price-cost relationship 
according to industry-specific production and distribution methods. 
Studies focused on the methods used to coordinate industrial devel-
opment through uniform cost accounting, standardized production 
and grading systems, and codes of ethics affecting prices and wages. 
Indeed, there was great hope that rationalizing intra-firm  management 
through research-based rules might stem business cycles, reduce waste, 
and provide a more equitable system of competition, minimizing social 
costs. These intra-firm management techniques were often codified 
by trade associations and sanctioned by FTC regulators, particularly 
when sponsored through FTC trade practice conferences. Ultimately, 
these research centers helped establish organizational and professional 
authority by disassociating such coordinating tactics with private self-
interest or cartelization. Instead, research and publicity supported 
association-based cooperation as an alternative to both free market 
competition and state socialism.
The Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration promised 
a new era of business organization and managerial efficiency achieved 
through expert accountants and managers, which it publicized to the 
US Chamber of Commerce. For example, Paul Cherington explained, 
the business school’s course “Commercial Organization” had developed 
its “own system of uniform cost accounting,” which “trained recruits” 
mastered in banking, railroad rate making, commercial law, and gen-
eral accounting.37 Students attended discursive lectures by professors 
and industry leaders and then performed fieldwork as an apprentice of 
sorts. The scientific accounting methods of these “commercial secretar-
ies” explained pricing policies and provided important legal defense for 
price protection policies by a single firm or a group of firms. Instituting 
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a uniform system of cost accounting became one of the most important 
prerequisites to coordinating business group best practices.38
The Harvard Bureau of Business Research had been established 
“for the purpose of assembling and classifying business data and 
establishing … standards and principles of business action.” The school 
employed the institutionalist research methods, and many of its early 
leaders subscribed the movement’s progressive policy agenda.39 From its 
outset, Dean Edwin Gay, a trained institutional economist, complained 
that “no accounting and statistical standard existed” especially in retail 
management, where competition between chain stores and independent 
proprietors frequently drove prices below the latter’s costs. The politi-
cal backlash provoked by highly competitive industries had  encouraged 
campaigns for protective legislation and a sincere questioning of 
whether or not concentration and consolidation benefited consumers in 
the long run.
Gay steered Harvard’s directors to conduct its first study in the retail 
distribution of shoes. Given that industry’s relatively standardized and 
stable production methods, retail management techniques could be 
isolated and analyzed.40 The “Harvard System” developed a coopera-
tive framework of information sharing—600 participating shoe retailers 
from across the country submitted sales data to the Bureau’s statisti-
cians, who created standard accounting methods and principles. They 
measured each store’s gross profits, total operating expenses (exclud-
ing freight, cartage, and interest), buying expenses, sales force, adver-
tising, deliveries, rent, interest, stockturns per year, and annual sales 
of the average salesperson. The Bureau, then, calculated percentages for 
each category and circulated comparative charts to show how the least 
and most profitable businesses operated.41 The data showed how firm 
management dictated prices and profitability. Additionally, the data 
provided the requisite information to sufficiently identify predatory 
practices, which associations might prohibit. Similarly, Edwin Gay later 
partnered with the progressive liberal business leader, Henry Dennison, 
to advance voluntary reforms to corporate governance in support of 
profit-sharing plans and pension plans.42 Social science investigations 
could be used to improve business management techniques as well as to 
expose the social costs and benefits of competing systems.
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During the war, Mitchell had envisioned creating a nonparti-
san institute to provide serviceable social science data for both public 
and private management purposes; antitrust law, however, presented 
an obstacle. It was not clear what information-sharing constituted 
an attempt to restrain trade.43 Under Mitchell’s guidance, the 
NBER partnered with the Department of Commerce and the FTC 
for information gathering purposes. The accumulation and analysis 
of such knowledge, Mitchell argued, required permanent public and 
private institutions to support social science research and guide public 
policies.44
That relationship with government continued after the war; at the 
behest of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, Mitchell received 
an invitation to participate in President Warren Harding’s Conference 
on Unemployment in 1921. Mitchell joined the business cycle com-
mittee, along with Owen Young (chairman, General Electric), Joseph 
Defrees (president, Chamber of Commerce), Matthew Woll (American 
Federation of Labor), Mary Van Kleeck (Russell Sage Foundation). To 
avoid future economic recessions, the committee’s final report called for 
greater information sharing between business and government for the 
purpose of private and public planning.
The best service Government can render is to collect the necessary infor-
mation to show us what the present situation in business is, what current 
trends are, to collect comparatively simple statistics from a very wide cir-
cle of industries, to put it in effective form and then make use of it by the 
business public.45
Mitchell, who had been a founding member of the institutional eco-
nomics school, was perhaps one of the best experts to reach out to the 
business community and explain the micro- and macroeconomic ben-
efits of cooperative research, rulemaking, and economic planning. His 
book, Business Cycles (1913), had famously explained economic down-
turns as the result of endogenous shocks that reverberated throughout 
the economy.46 He had categorized the variables that determine prof-
its, revenue, and costs, and he explained how each variable responded 
to stages of a cycle. Mitchell’s study concluded that “during the revivals 
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prices of labor rise less than prices of commodities.”47 This wage lag cre-
ated a problem of underconsumption that could retard recovery.
As a result of his academic work and participation on the confer-
ence committee, Mitchell supported “social experimentation” in pri-
vate and public unemployment insurance programs to protect workers 
during economic downturns.48 While not all conference participants 
embraced unemployment relief and insurance plans, Mitchell urged 
Hoover to embrace relief in order to achieve recovery. Hoover took 
credit for creating unemployment branch offices in states with severe 
unemployment; those offices then partnered with federal agencies.49 
The conference recommendations reflected institutionalists’ concerns 
with uncoordinated economic activities leading to problematic social 
consequences, like unemployment and waste of natural resources, 
which required government oversight and coordination of private sec-
tor business decisions. The final report also brought together multiple 
disciplines to achieve macroeconomic stability, appealing to economists, 
businessmen, statisticians, and social workers. Mitchell remained a part 
of Hoover’s Commerce Department, acting as a lead economist to the 
Advisory Committee on Statistics aiding in the Department’s Current 
Survey.50
In addition to the NBER, several other private and university-based 
research institutes emerged in this period. In 1923, Charles Merriam, 
a professor of political science, established the Social Science Research 
Council (SSRC) at the University of Chicago. The SSRC employed 
similar empirical methods and, by the early 1930s, became influen-
tial in national political economy. Like Mitchell, Merriam rejected the 
rational man theory of value in neoclassical economics. Instead, he pio-
neered quantitative studies on individual decision making that could 
be aggregated in order to better understand how democracies think, so 
to speak. He envisioned these data being particularly useful to politi-
cal leaders and their social scientist advisors.51 Ultimately, he is cred-
ited with founding the behavioralist approach to the practice of politics, 
which, similar to institutionalist economics, employed modern psychol-
ogy and statistical research to understand individual choice and plural-
ist decision making. His goal with the SSRC and later organizations, 
such as the Public Administration Clearing House, was to improve 
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government administration through social science research so as to 
achieve democratic ends, charting a path between free market capital-
ism and state socialism.52 Also like Mitchell, those goals brought him 
back to federal government service, both within President Hoover’s 
Research Committee on Social Trends, in 1929, and President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s National Planning Board, in 1933.53
Each of these organizations brought the social sciences closer to busi-
ness management and public policy making, though in distinct ways. 
HBS sought to professionalize business management not only in the 
pursuit of profits but also toward the public interest. NBER’s goal to 
gather and disseminate micro- and macroeconomic data to mitigate 
business cycles brought its economists in direct contact with both busi-
ness leaders and policy makers. Likewise, the SSRC’s research agenda 
focused on minimizing the social costs of American capitalism through 
economic reforms aimed at raising social minima. Although each 
attempted to retain its impartiality, the thin line between scientific 
management and social economic planning blurred as social scientists 
moved between groups, cross-pollinating ideas and institutions.
***
For institutionalists like Mitchell, Hamilton, and JM Clark, insti-
tutionalism affirmed that business was broadly “affected with a pub-
lic interest.”54 Institutionalists also espoused a firm commitment to 
deliberative processes, following their commitment to social scientific 
inquiry, economic measurement, and fact-gathering.55 From that devel-
oped the managerial economics of pricing behavior of firms, macro 
studies of business cycles, organizational theories of ownership and cor-
porate governance, and public-private designs for competition policy. 
The theme of social control runs throughout each of these categories of 
inquiry. The idea of social control of business steered institutionalists to 
develop government regulation toward socially desirable outcomes. This 
diverse group chose different routes to that end. Hamilton, for exam-
ple, joined the Yale Law School and focused his efforts on constitutional 
arguments to abandon the legal formalism of yesteryear.56 He remained 
firmly an antitruster who believed in the public-private tradition of 
managed competition. He reentered government service as an assistant 
attorney general to Thurman Arnold in 1938. Mitchell continued to 
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gather data and direct research initiatives at the NBER and proposed 
modest indicative planning.
The crisis of the Great Depression created a catalyst for social-polit-
ical change in the USA, and under these circumstances policy  makers, 
regulators, and business leaders drew from existing paradigms of eco-
nomic management. The influence of a more radical strand of insti-
tutionalists peaked during the First New Deal with the National 
Industrial Recovery Act, but outright price fixing failed to pass consti-
tutional muster. Nevertheless, institutional economics and the vision 
of managed competition as a public-private exchange persisted through 
piecemeal legislation in the Second New Deal. But it was the continued 
authority of the FTC as the manager of competition, evolving through 
administrative law rather than statutory mandate, which provided its 
truly lasting legacy.57
Public-private cooperation between regulators and business groups—
for better or worse—has become embedded in American state-building. 
In addition to various trade associations’ success at coordinating indus-
try standards, information sharing on costs and prices, and intra-group 
monitoring, businesspeople learned that greater political power and 
legitimacy resulted from collaborating with academics and government 
officials. But this was not a straightforward “capture” story.58 These 
coalitions promulgated a vision for managed competition that must be 
understood as resulting from that interwar cooperation. In other words, 
we cannot understand the interest group story of managed competition 
without appreciating how an alternative vision of American capitalism 
resulted from an ongoing exchange between institutional economists, 
public regulators, and private research institutes. We cannot understand 
the complexity or contingency of US political economy without rec-
ognizing the plurality of visions for American capitalism that rejected 
free market competition but yet did not embrace state socialism either. 
Within these interstices, the institutionalists helped build the modern 
American system of public and private economic governance.
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